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Abstract
Using households’ balance sheet composition in the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, we 
identify six household types. Since 1999, there has been a decline in the share of patient 
households and an increase in the share of impatient households with negative wealth. 
Using a six-agent New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions, we explore how 
changes in households’ shares affect the transmission of government spending shocks. We 
show that the relative share of households in the left tail of the wealth distribution plays a key 
role in the aggregate marginal propensity to consume, the magnitude of fi scal multipliers, 
and the distributional consequences of government spending shocks. While the output 
and consumption multipliers are positively correlated with the share of households with 
negative wealth, the size of the employment multiplier is negatively correlated. Moreover, 
our calibrated model delivers jobless fi scal expansions.
Keywords: panel survey of income dynamics, household balance sheet, fi scal policy,
six-agent New Keynesian model, search and matching.
JEL classifi cation: E21, E62.
Resumen
En este trabajo identifi camos seis tipos de hogares en Estados Unidos en función de la 
composición de su balance fi nanciero en el Panel Survey of Income Dynamics. Desde 1999 
se observa una acusada disminución en la proporción de hogares ahorradores y un aumento 
en la proporción de hogares endeudados, en particular aquellos que presentan una riqueza 
neta negativa. Utilizando como marco teórico un modelo neokeynesiano con estos seis 
tipos de hogares, así como con imperfecciones en los mercados de crédito y de trabajo, 
exploramos cómo los cambios en la distribución de los hogares en función de su balance 
afectan la transmisión de los shocks del gasto público al consumo agregado, al empleo
y al PIB. Encontramos que la proporción de hogares en la cola izquierda de la distribución 
de la riqueza desempeña un papel clave en la propensión marginal agregada al consumo, la
magnitud de los multiplicadores fi scales y las consecuencias distributivas de los shocks 
del gasto público. Si bien el valor de los multiplicadores de producción y consumo está 
correlacionado positivamente con la proporción de hogares con riqueza negativa, el tamaño 
del multiplicador de empleo decrece con la proporción de este tipo de consumidores.
Palabras clave: Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, balance fi nanciero de los hogares, 
política fi scal, modelo neokeynesiano, fricciones de búsqueda y emparejamiento.
Códigos JEL: E21, E62.
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1 Introduction
The 2008 financial turmoil hit households’ financial position hard: Credit froze, and the
prices of financial and real assets plummeted. In the aftermath of the Great Recession, there
was a widespread consensus on the use of discretionary fiscal policy as a tool to mitigate the
adverse effects of the crisis.1 In this paper, we aim to isolate the role of households’ balance
sheets in the transmission of government spending shocks. To do so, we first identify, using
data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID)2, six types of households as a
function of their balance sheet composition and show that their relative shares have changed
significantly in the United States since the Great Recession. Second, using the empirical
weights for the PSID cross-sections since 1999, we calibrate a six-agent New Keynesian
model with search and matching frictions and show that the aggregate fiscal multipliers for
output, consumption, and employment are sensitive to the distribution of households’ shares.
Recent literature on household heterogeneity and the transmission of fiscal shocks has
highlighted the following empirical facts: (i) individual consumption responses to a govern-
ment spending shock are negatively correlated with a household’s net worth and positively
correlated with her indebtedness level; (ii) the responses of aggregate consumption and out-
put to government spending shocks are higher in periods of high aggregate indebtedness level
or financial distress with high levels of debt and financial distress; and (iii) there is a strong
positive correlation between wealth inequality and the magnitude of fiscal multipliers. We
argue that these empirical regularities can be tied together through some degree of financial
heterogeneity in the household sector and changes in the distribution of households over
time.
Our identification strategy using the PSID is based on first classifying households using
their ratio of non-housing net worth to income as patient (Ricardian) or impatient. We,
then, further disaggregate impatient households by looking at the assets and liabilities sides
of their balance sheets. On the asset side, we focus only on real estate holdings classifying
households as a function of homeownership. On the liabilities side, we consider mortgage
debt holdings for homeowners and uncollateralized debt holdings –credit card debt, student
loans, etc – for non-homeowners. Among homeowners, we consider three types of households:
homeowners without a mortgage, homeowners with high leverage, and homeowners with low
leverage. Non-homeowners can be indebted or debt free. Indebted non-homeowners are
1The U.S. Congress passed the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009, and several smaller stimulus measures that became law in 2009 and 2010. Overall, the fiscal
stimulus was about 7 percent of GDP.
2Panel Study of Income Dynamics, public use dataset. Produced and distributed by the Institute for
Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (2017)
households without real estate but with uncollateralized debt holdings, that is, impatient
households with negative wealth holdings. We document that the shares of these six types
of households in the PSID were quite stable until 2007, when the share of patient households
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began to steadily decline and the share of impatient households with negative wealth started
to increase.
We explore the role played by the observed changes in the distribution of households
in the transmission mechanism of government spending shocks by calibrating a six-agent
New Keynesian model with the empirical weights estimated in the PSID for each of the
waves from 1999 to 2013. Our model features savers and spenders, differences in portfolio
compositions, and differences in the capacity to extract collateral from real estate holdings
or from expected income. In order to isolate balance sheet heterogeneity, we assume search
and matching frictions in the labor market so that all households perceive the same labor
income regardless of their characteristics.
We conclude that the effects of fiscal policy shocks on individual consumption are very
sensitive to the structure of the household’s balance sheet of the household. As expected,
while the response of patient households’ consumption to an expansionary government spend-
ing shock is negative, the responses of all impatient households are positive. Moreover, indi-
vidual consumption responses are a decreasing function of the level of household wealth. We
find that, among impatient households, the response of consumption is stronger for indebted
households. We also find that the individual consumption response is an increasing function
of the indebtedness level. Consequently, as the distribution of household shares in the PSID
has changed over time, the model-implied aggregate marginal propensity to consume and
the output multiplier have changed significantly. For example, the model-implied output
multiplier is about 55 percent larger in 2013 than in 1999, mostly because of the increase
in the share of households with negative wealth. The sharp consumption response of these
constrained households reduces the marginal utility of further consumption, putting addi-
tional upward pressure on wages. In the model, then firms become more reluctant to incur
the cost of posting new vacancies, relying on adjustments in the intensive margin to meet
the boost in demand. Consequently, in the model, the increase in the output multiplier since
1999 is paired with a decline in the employment multiplier. Finally, in our model, the size
of the fiscal effect is also positively correlated with wealth inequality. In particular, we find
a strong correlation between the model-implied Gini coefficient for wealth and the output
fiscal multiplier. Therefore, our calibrated model is able to account for the empirical facts
described earlier.
We finally explore the normative issue of the welfare effect of government spending shocks.
We find that the welfare cost varies substantially across households types. While an increase
in government spending implies a welfare loss for patient households and impatient consumers
with housing, the welfare of the remaining impatient households increases. Thus, the effect
on aggregate welfare of changes in government spending depends critically on the distribution
of wealth and credit among the population. We find that the share of households in the left
tail of the net wealth distribution has a disproportionate effect on the aggregate marginal
propensity to consume, the value of the fiscal multiplier and the distributional consequences
of fiscal shocks.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the related literature.
Section 3 describes the data set and the criteria used to identify the types of households
according to their balance sheet positions. Section 4 introduces the theoretical model. Sec-
tion 5 discusses our calibration strategy. Section 6 explores the transmission mechanism
of government spending shocks in the model and its evolution for each of the PSID waves.
Section 7 analyzes the relationship between fiscal multipliers and wealth inequality and also
explores the welfare effects of fiscal shocks. Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature review
This paper is related to the literature on the effects of fiscal policy in an economy with
financial frictions. Some papers such as Agarwal et al. (2007), using U.S. data, and Agarwal
and Quian (2014), using Singapore data, show that, after a government transfer, spending
increases the most for consumers who were most likely to be financially constrained. In
our model, financial rigidities take the form of housing collateral, as in Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997); Iacoviello (2005); and Liu et al. (2013).3
This paper is also related to the literature analyzing the effect of heterogeneous behavior
and distributional dynamics in the aggregate effects of economic shocks. Carroll et al. (2014)
and Carroll et al. (2017) set up a model with heterogeneity in the rate of time preference to
show that matching the wealth distribution is key to obtaining a realistic distribution of the
marginal propensity to consume. In Kaplan and Violante (2014) and Kaplan et al. (2014)
households can store wealth in liquid or illiquid assets and hand-to-mouth behavior emerges
endogenously, both in poor households and wealthy households with illiquid assets. They
show that hand-to-mouth households, both wealthy and poor, have significantly stronger
responses to transitory income shocks than non-hand-to-mouth households. For Krueger
et al. (2016), household heterogeneity in terms of earnings, wealth, and the time discount
3Fern´ındez-Villaverde (2010) explores the transmission of fiscal shocks in a model with financial frictions
in the form of an endogenous premium on loans, and Canzoneri et al. (2016) consider financial frictions in
the form of a bank intermediation cost.
factor is essential to understanding the amplification effect of aggregate productivity shocks.
The amplification channel is only present when there is a large fraction of households in the
left tail of the distribution.
Recently, this literature has focused on the role of household heterogeneity in the trans-
mission of fiscal policy. Brinca et al. (2016) develop a life-cycle model with heterogeneous
agents and incomplete markets. Households are heterogeneous with respect to asset hold-
ings, productivity, and rate of time preference. They find that the fiscal multiplier is highly
sensitive to the fraction of the population facing binding credit constraints and to the av-
erage wealth level in the economy. Antunes and Ercolani (2016) use a general equilibrium,
á
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flexible-price model with household heterogeneity in terms of wealth and endogenous house-
hold borrowing against uncollateralized assets to study the effects of fiscal-driven expansions
of public debt on output, credit, and welfare. For example, the dynamics of the household
borrowing limit generated by these policies increases the utility of borrowers and wealth-
poor agents, while it reduces that of the wealth-rich group. The model by Oh and Reis
(2012) includes borrowing constraints and price rigidities to show the importance of using
targeted public transfers to redistribute wealth across agents in order to increase aggregate
consumption, employment, and output. McKay and Reis (2016) augment this framework to
study the effects of automatic stabilizers in the United States. Their model considers two
groups of households divided according to their degree of impatience and allows for shocks
to skills and labor status for the impatient households, generating a changing distribution
of wealth and marginal propensities to consume over the cycle.
In our model, the responses of asset prices and debt to the government spending shocks
are key in the characterization of the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. The link
between house price movements and household consumption has been widely studied in the
literature (see, for example, Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Attanasio, Blow, Hamilton, and
Leicester, 2009; and Angrisani, Hurd, and Rohwedder, 2015). Recently, researchers have
studied the role of household debt in the transmission of fiscal policy. Parker et al. (2013)
find that, after a tax rebate, homeowners spend more than renters. Surico and Trezzi (2015)
find that the response to a change in property taxes is more pronounced for homeowners
with mortgage debt and Cloyne and Surico (2017) show that homeownership per se is not
the driver of the different consumption response to a tax change but mortgage indebtedness.
Acconcia et al. (2015) show that government transfers have an effect on consumption only
for indebted homeowners with low liquidity-to-wealth ratio. Misra and Surico (2014) also
find that households with both a high level of mortgage debt and a high level of income have
the largest propensity to consume after a tax rebate.
Moreover, the aggregate effects of fiscal shocks are higher in environments characterized
by heightened financial stress. Based on a panel of OECD countries, Klein (2017a) concludes
that fiscal consolidation leads to severe contractions when implemented in high private debt
states. Demyanyk et al. (2016) document that relative fiscal multipliers are higher in U.S.
geographies with higher consumer indebtedness. Bernardini and Peersman (2016) find the
aggregate government spending multiplier in the United States over the past century to be
higher in periods of private debt overhang. Using data on U.S. states, Bernardini et al.
(2017) estimate fiscal multipliers ranging from 0 and more than 4 in the period surrounding
the Great Recession, depending on the state of the business cycle, household indebtedness,
and the interaction between the two.
Along the lines of Brinca et al. (2016) and Carroll et al. (2017), our model predicts a
positive correlation between the fiscal multiplier and wealth inequality. Agnello and Sousa
(2014) find that spending-driven fiscal adjustments deteriorate income distribution, whereas
in Klein and Winkler (2017), austerity leads to a strong and persistent increase in income
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inequality only in periods of private debt overhang. DeGiorgi and Gambetti (2012) find that
after a government spending shock consumption increases at the bottom of the consumption
distribution but falls at the top, implying a reduction of consumption inequality. Also,
Anderson et al. (2016) conclude that government spending policy shocks tend to decrease
consumption for the wealthiest individuals and increase it for the poorest.
3 Identifying household types in the data
In this section, we describe our identification strategy for households as a function of their
individual characteristics along three dimensions: attitude towards savings, homeownership,
and access to credit. We consider data for the 1999-2013 period from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID), which surveys a representative sample of U.S. households and
individuals every odd year.
We first classify households as patient or impatient by comparing their non-housing
wealth and their income. We focus on non-housing wealth because investment in real estate
may be considered compatible with a high discount of the future by impatient households to
the extent that housing provides current utility services. Non-housing wealth corresponds
to the PSID variable “wealth” net of the equity value of the main home.4 Our definition of
income includes salaries and other compensation plus private and government transfers.5
Table 1 summarizes our identification strategy of household types. As described in the
first column of Table 1, we use a threshold strategy to classify households as patient or
impatient: a household is classified as patient (impatient) if her non-housing wealth is above
(below) a certain percentage a of her income. In this paper, we also incorporate into the
analysis households with negative wealth, who are classified as impatient households. Once
a household qualifies as patient, we do not impose any additional restrictions on her balance
sheet.
4Non-housing wealth balances include the net value of farm or business assets; the value of checking
accounts, savings accounts, money market funds, certificates of deposits, savings bonds, Treasury bills, and
other IRAs; the value of debts other than mortgages (credit cards, student loans, medical and legal bills,
personal loans); the net value of real estate other than main home; the value of private annuities or IRAs;
the value of shares of stock in publicly held corporations; mutual or investment trusts; the value of other
investments in trusts or estates, bond funds, life insurance policies, and special collections; and the net value
of vehicle or other assets “on wheels”.
5Income incorporates salary; dividends; rent payments received; worker compensation; trust fund in-
come; financial support from relatives; financial support from non-relatives; child support received; alimony
received; supplemental security income; temporary assistance for needy families (state program) and other
welfare; pensions/annuity; lump sum payments (inheritances, itemized deductions); and financial support
given to others.
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Table 1: Household Classification: Our Proposal
Threshold Homeowner Liabilities Leverage
Patient: R W ≥ a ∗ I Unrestricted Unrestricted Unrestricted
Impatient: HH 0 < W < a ∗ I Yes No No
Impatient: BL 0 < W < a ∗ I Yes Mortgage debt Low
Impatient: BH 0 < W < a ∗ I Yes Mortgage debt High
Impatient: HNH 0 < W < a ∗ I No No No
Impatient: EK W ≤ 0 No Non-mortgage debt Unrestricted
Columns 2 to 4 in Table 1 summarize the classification criteria for balance sheet composi-
tion used for impatient households. We define five types of impatient households depending
on whether they have assets, liabilities, or both in their balance sheet. In our identification
strategy, we restrict the asset side of the balance sheet to one type of asset, real estate, while
we consider two types of liabilities: mortgages (collateral-based debt) and non-collateral
debt. In the PSID, non-collateral debt includes credit cards, student loans, medical and
legal bills, and personal loans.
Among impatient households with real estate holdings, we distinguish three types of
households: (i) households who own houses but do not borrow against them, labeled as
HH ; (ii) households whose loan-to-value ratios exceed the median loan-to-value ratio in the
sample, labeled as BH ; and (iii) households with a low loan-to-value ratio, labeled as BL.
We consider two types of impatient households without assets: (i) households who, along the
lines of traditional hand-to-mouth consumers of Gal´ı et al. (2007), do not hold any assets
or liabilities, labeled as HNH ; and (ii) households who borrow against their future labor
income, as in Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), thus holding a negative wealth, labeled as
EK.
We explore several values for the threshold a ∈ (0, 1). In Table 2, we report the empirical
shares for the 1999 wave for a = {0.25, 0.50, 0.75}. The shares for households using the
different cutoffs are within the values considered reasonable for calibration purposes. For
clarity, in the reminder of the paper, we perform the analysis with the a = 0.50 threshold,
although we analyze the robustness of our results for the other cutoff values in Section 6.
Table 2: PSID Sample Weights (in %) for Year 1999
a = 0.25 a = 0.50 a = 0.75
Patient: R 58 43 35
Impatient: HH 3 5 6
Impatient: BL 3 6 9
Impatient: BH 7 11 13
Impatient: HNH 13 19 21
Impatient: EK 16 16 16
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Next, we characterize the distribution of non-housing wealth (in real terms) for the 1999
PSID wave. Table 3 reports the percentiles of the wealth distribution for each household
category. By construction, indebted impatient households without assets – households with
negative wealth , EK, – are classified as the least wealthy for all wealth quantiles. But, more
importantly, for all wealth quantiles, patient households can be classified as the wealthiest
households, which aligns well with our classification of these households as savers or patient.
Moreover, Table 3 also provides evidence on the dispersion of the wealth distribution for each
type of household. The most disperse wealth distribution corresponds to patient households.
Table 3: Non-housing (Real) Wealth Percentiles for Year 1999
Household p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Patient: R 13,210 27,685 65,652 166,108 402,615
Impatient: HH 791 1,582 4,271 8,701 16,532
Impatient: BL 1,622 4,350 10,599 18,351 29,267
Impatient: BH 1,661 3,639 8,543 14,633 24,521
Impatient: HNH 406 1,186 3,164 7,119 11,865
Impatient: EK -15,978 -5,932 -949 0 0
Note: The values represent the cutoff values for real non-housing wealth.
Table 4 reports the shares of each type of household that belong to the interquartile
ranges of the overall wealth distribution in our sample for 1999. While most of the Ricar-
dian households are concentrated in the interquartile ranges above the median wealth in the
sample, all impatient households with negative wealth, EK, are concentrated in the lower
25 percent tail of the wealth distribution for households. The bulk of the other impatient
households is concentrated around the median of the wealth distributions. Most of the im-
patient households with positive wealth fall into the interquartile ranges around the median
of the wealth distribution.
Table 4: Distribution of Households across Real Non-Housing Wealth
Percentiles for each Household Type: 1999
Percentile p0- p10 p10 - p25 p25 - p50 p50 - p75 p75 - p90 p90 - p100
Patient: R 0 1 5 32 36 25
Impatient: HH 0 10 66 23 1 0
Impatient: BL 0 4 40 54 2 0
Impatient: BH 0 4 48 46 2 0
Impatient: HNH 0 15 68 16 0 0
Impatient: EK 44 56 0 0 0 0
Note: Percentiles are bolded to represent the bracket containing that percentile; that is, p10 - p25 indicates
that p25 ≥ wealth > p10.
Again, if we consider the overall wealth distribution of the households in our sample, we
can run the identification strategy defined in Table 1 for each interquartile range. Table 5
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shows that the lowest 10 percentiles of the overall wealth distribution are populated only by
indebted impatient households without assets and that the highest 25 percentiles are mostly
populated by patient households. However, the interquartile ranges around the median – 25
to 50 and 50 to 75 – highlight the diversity of household types in the middle of the wealth
distribution.
Table 5: Distribution of Households within Real Non-Housing Wealth
Percentiles for Year 1999
Percentile p0- p10 p10 - p25 p25 - p50 p50 - p75 p75 - p90 p90 - p100
Patient: R 0 3 9 52 97 99
Impatient: HH 0 4 13 4 0 0
Impatient: BL 0 2 10 13 1 0
Impatient: BH 0 4 20 19 1 0
Impatient: HNH 0 21 49 11 0 0
Impatient: EK 100 71 0 0 0 0
Note: Percentiles are bolded to represent the bracket containing that percentile; that is, p10 - p25 indicates
that p25 ≥ wealth > p10.
Having offered a picture of the wealth distribution, we turn to the income distribution,
which is summarized by the quantiles in Table 6. In this case, the picture is slightly different:
Patient households do not have the highest level of income. For example, the median income
of a patient household is 12 percent lower than the median income of impatient homeowners
with mortgage debt.
Comparing Table 3 and Table 6, we conclude that, at the median, a patient household has
a non-housing wealth that is 65 percent larger than her income, while the wealth-to-income
ratio for impatient households is below 1. Moreover, Table 7 shows the share of patient
households for all income interquartiles of the overall income distribution in the sample, even
for the lowest ones, is significant. For example, almost 30 percent of households in the 0 to
10 percentile bracket are classified as patient. Thus, we argue that the threshold strategy we
propose here allows us to separate households as a function of their attitude toward savings,
not as a function of the liquidity constraints they may face. This is why we label patient
households as Ricardian – we assume they behave following Ricardian equivalence.
Table 6: (Real) Income Percentiles for Year 1999
Household p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Patient: R 9,522 22,103 39,550 66,316 102,434
Impatient: HH 7,155 14,238 25,628 38,954 55,369
Impatient: BL 18,292 29,449 44,699 66,588 96,897
Impatient: BH 19,799 31,656 44,580 63,343 87,405
Impatient: HNH 7,910 13,842 22,955 34,408 49,042
Impatient: EK 3,250 7,248 15,029 26,819 38,509
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Table 7: Distribution of Households within Real Income Percentiles for
Year 1999
Percentile p0- p10 p10 - p25 p25 - p50 p50 - p75 p75 - p90 p90 - p100
Patient: R 32 31 35 44 55 71
Impatient: HH 6 7 6 6 3 2
Impatient: BL 1 3 5 8 11 9
Impatient: BH 1 3 8 17 19 13
Impatient: HNH 18 28 28 17 8 3
Impatient: EK 43 27 18 8 3 2
Note: Percentiles are bolded to represent the bracket containing that percentile; that is, p10 - p25 indicates
that p25 ≥ RealIncome > p10.
We revise the evolution of non-housing wealth for each household category over time in
Figure 1. The two distributions that change the most are the one for Ricardians, which
shifts more density to its right tail, and the one for impatient households with no assets and
no liabilities, which gets a fatter left tail. These results point toward an increase in wealth
inequality, which is evident when computing the Gini coefficient: it increases from 0.851 in
1999 to 0.874 in 2013, as reported in Table A.1 in Appendix A.
Table 8 reports the empirical weights for each type of household in each PSID wave from
1999 to 2013. Our identification strategy leads, on average, to a 40 percent share of patient
households and, hence, a 60 percent share of impatient households. The share of impatient
households without assets is larger than the share of impatient households with assets, on
average, 40 percent and 20 percent, respectively. Over time, the distribution of shares is
quite stable until 2007, when there are bigger shifts across categories. The largest changes
in the relative share in the population are for patient households and indebted impatient
households without assets, EK. The share of patient households declines from 43 percent in
1999 to 37 percent in 2013, while the share of indebted impatient households without assets
increases from 16 percent to 24 percent.6
Table 8: PSID Sample Weights (in %)
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Patient: R 43 43 43 42 42 38 38 37
Impatient: HH 5 4 5 4 4 3 4 4
Impatient: BL 6 7 7 7 6 7 6 5
Impatient: BH 11 12 11 11 10 10 9 9
Impatient: HNH 19 18 18 19 19 19 20 20
Impatient: EK 16 16 16 17 19 22 23 24
Total Impatient 57 57 57 58 58 62 62 63
6Appendix C overviews the classification suggested by Kaplan et al. (2014) of households as Ricardians,
wealthy hand-to-mouth, and poor hand-to-mouth.
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Figure 1: Real Non-Housing Wealth by Household Type
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(b) Impatient homeowners without liabilities
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(c) Impatient homeowners with low leverage
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(d) Impatient homeowners with high leverage
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(e) Impatient non-homeowners without liabil-
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4 The model
We consider a standard New Keynesian model with balance sheet heterogeneity in the house-
hold sector and search and matching frictions. Andre´s et al. (2015) argue that the response
of the intensive and extensive margins of labor to fiscal shocks is key to explaining the size
of the output multiplier in the presence of financial heterogeneity. We assume that there is
perfect risk sharing among household members and that all workers are equally productive
and delegate the negotiation of wages and hours with firms to a union. Thus, in equilibrium,
all households earn the same labor income. Abstracting from labor income heterogeneity
and from the potential interactions between employment status and household balance sheet
composition are strong assumptions. But, in this way, we can isolate the role of diversity in
households’ balance-sheet composition in the transmission of government spending shocks.
4.1 Households
The economy is populated by N households who differ in their degree of impatience, the
conditions of access to credit, and homeownership status. Let N i denote the mass of ith type
households and τ i = N
i
N
be the weight of the ith type households in the total population.
Ricardian households, R, are the standard financially unconstrained patient households
in macro models. Ricardian households are net savers/lenders that own assets other than
their main home (physical capital, deposits, public debt, etc.) and do not have liabilities. In
our economy, Ricardian households coexist with financially constrained individuals who are
more impatient than them. Some, but not all, impatient households are net borrowers. We
assume that borrowers face a binding borrowing constraint due to some underlying friction
in the credit market.
While some impatient households are homeowners, others do not have housing. Among
impatient homeowners, we distinguish three types of households according to the quality
of the collateral services provided by their real estate: (i) households who own houses but
do not have access to credit – HH households; (ii) households who can borrow against a
high proportion of the expected value of their real estate holdings – BH households; and
(iii) households who can borrow against a low proportion of the expected value of their
home – BL households. Impatient homeowners with access to credit resemble borrowers a`
la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005).
We consider two types of impatient households without housing holdings: (i) traditional
hand-to-mouth consumers a` la Gal´ı et al. (2007) who have zero net worth – HNH households;
and (ii) households who borrow against their current and expected future labor income, as
in Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) – EK households – and, hence, have negative wealth.
The specification of preferences is common across household types although parameteri-
zations are type-specific. Households’ life time utility function is defined over consumption,
cit; housing holdings, x
i
t; and leisure of her employed and unemployed members. l1t are hours
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worked per employee, and l2 are hours spent job seeking by the unemployed members of the
household. Hours worked are determined through the bargaining process between the union
and firms, while the hours devoted to job seeking are determined exogenously,
Et
∞∑
t=0
βti
[
ln cit + φ
i
x ln x
i
t + φ1n
i
t−1
[1− l1t]1−η
1− η + φ2
(
1− nit−1
) [1− l2]1−η
1− η
]
, (1)
where βi is the type-specific discount rate. In particular, we assume that all impatient
households share the same discount factor, βI , and that the discount rate for Ricardians
households, βR is larger than that for impatient households. As shown in Iacoviello (2005),
in the absence of uncertainty, the assumption βR > βI ensures that the borrowing constraints
for impatient households are binding. We assume that homeowners share the same parameter
governing preferences over housing, φRx = φ
HH
x = φ
BH
x = φ
BL
x = φx, and this parameter is set
to zero for households without real estate holdings. The remaining preference parameters
are the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, η; the valuation of leisure by employed members of
the household, φ1; and the valuation of leisure by the unemployed members, φ2.
Another common feature of the optimization problem of households is the law of motion
for employment, nit, in the constraint set, which is given by
nit = (1− σ)nit−1 + ρwt
(
1− nit−1
)
, (2)
Under our model assumptions, nit = nt for all households and jobs are destroyed each period
at the exogenous rate σ. New employment opportunities come at the rate ρwt , which is the
probability that an unemployed worker finds a job. This probability is taken as exogenous
by individual workers, but it is endogenously determined at the aggregate level according to
the matching function,
ρwt (1− nt−1) = χ1vχ2t [(1− nt−1) l2]1−χ2 , (3)
where vt stands for the number of active vacancies during period t, and χ1 and χ2 are the
parameters of the Cobb-Douglas matching function.
Finally, let Ωit be the value function for household i. Let us derive here the marginal value
of employment for a worker, λiht, which plays a key role in the bargaining process discussed
in the following. Essentially, λiht measures the marginal contribution of a newly created job
to the household’s utility
λiht ≡
∂Ωit
∂nit−1
= λi1twtl1t +
(
φ1
[1− l1t]1−η
1− η − φ2
[1− l2]1−η
1− η
)
+ [1− σ − ρwt ] βiEtλiht+1, (4)
where λi1t is the household’s marginal utility of consumption. The first term on the right
hand side captures the value of the cash flow generated by the new job at time t, evaluated in
consumption terms. The second term represents the net utility from the newly created job.
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The third term represents the “capital value” of an additional employed worker, conditional
on her keeping the employment status in the future.
Given our assumptions, the labor market decisions, both for the extensive and the in-
tensive margins, are identical for all households and, hence, they receive the same labor
income. Thus, in our model, heterogeneity in consumption can only be driven by differences
in balance sheet composition. In the remainder of this subsection, we describe the constraint
set for each type of household.
Ricardian households: Patient households are the only savers in the economy. They
lend dRt to the private sector and d
P
t to the public sector through short-term nominal con-
tracts. We assume that the nominal returns on public and private loans are equal to the
policy rate, rnt . Patient households are also the owners of physical capital, k
R
t . They under-
take productive investment, jRt , which is subject to adjustment costs. Patient households
accrue any extraordinary profits of firms in the form of dividends, fRt .
Patient consumers choose paths for consumption, cRt ; housing holdings, x
R
t ; leisure, 1−l1t;
private lending, dRt ; public lending, d
P
t ; and investment, j
R
t to optimize their lifetime utility
subject to the budget constraint, the capital accumulation equation, and the law of motion
for employment. The budget constraint for patient households is given by
cRt + j
R
t
[
1 +
φ
2
(
jRt
kRt−1
)]
+ qt
[
xRt − xRt−1
]
+ dRt + d
P
t = wtnt−1l1t + rtk
R
t−1
+
(
1 + rnt−1
) dPt−1 + dRt−1
1 + πt
+ fRt + trht, (5)
where wtnt−1l1t is the labor income earned by the fraction of employed workers, qt stands for
the real price of housing,
[
xRt − xRt−1
]
is housing investment, and trht stands for lump sum
transfers (taxes) from (to) the government. We assume that debt contracts are in nominal
terms and there is a fixed amount of real estate in the economy.
The capital accumulation equation is
kRt = (1− δ) kRt−1 + jRt . (6)
Impatient homeowners: Impatient homeowners use all of their disposable income
to consume and invest in housing. In addition to the law of motion of employment, their
constraint set contains a budget constraint and, if they are indebted, a borrowing constraint.
The budget constraint of impatient homeowners without liabilities, HH, is given by
cHHt + qt
(
xHHt − xHHt−1
)
= wtnt−1l1t, (7)
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while the borrowing constraint for indebted impatient homeowners, i = {BH,BL}, is
cit + qt
(
xit − xit−1
)
+
(
1 + rnt−1
) bit−1
1 + πt
= wtnt−1l1t + bit. (8)
Indebted impatient homeowners can borrow against the expected future value of their
housing holdings up to a fraction mi
bit ≤ miEt
[
qt+1 (1 + πt+1) x
i
t
1 + rnt
]
, (9)
with mi being larger for indebted impatient homeowners with high leverage than for those
with low leverage – that is, mBH > mBL .
Impatient non-homeowners: Impatient non-homeowners do not have housing. We
ignore the question of whether that is due to a lack of access to the market or preferences,
but we just assume that their valuation of homeownership is zero by imposing φjx = 0 in the
utility function. Impatient households without assets or liabilities, HH, are the traditional
hand-to-mouth consumers and their constraint set is characterized by the following budget
constraint:
cHNHt = wtnt−1l1t. (10)
We assume that indebted households without collateralizable assets, EK, borrow against
a weighted sum of their current and future labor income. In particular, their borrowing
constraint is given by
bEKt ≤ mEK
(
0.1wtntlt + Et
[
3∑
j=1
0.3
(1 + πt+j)wt+jnt+jl1,t+j
1 + rnt
])
(11)
and their budget constraint by
cEKt +
(
1 + rnt−1
) bEKt−1
1 + πt
= wtnt−1l1t + bEKt . (12)
4.2 Firms
Production in our model economy is organized in three different levels. Firms in the compet-
itive wholesale sector use labor and capital to produce a homogeneous good, which is bought
by monopolistically competitive intermediate firms. These intermediate firms transform the
homogenous good into firm-specific varieties that are bought by retail firms. The competitive
retail sector is populated by firms producing homogeneous final goods, yt, by combining a
continuum of intermediate goods.
Retailers: The retail sector is populated by infinitely lived and perfectly competitive
firms producing final goods, yt, by combining a continuum of intermediate goods, y
l
t, l ∈ [0, 1],
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according to a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. The profit maximization problem for retailers is
given by
Maxylt
{
Ptyt −
∫ 1
0
P lty
l
tdl
}
,
subject to
yt =
[∫ 1
0
(
ylt
)(1−1/θ)
dl
] θ
θ−1
. (13)
Intermediate goods producers: There is a continuum of infinitely lived producers of
intermediate goods, indexed by l ∈ [0, 1], operating under monopolistic competition. They
buy the wholesale good at price Pwt and transform it into a firm-specific variety y
l
t that is
sold to the retail firm at price P lt .
Intermediate goods producers face a pricing problem in a sticky price framework a` la
Calvo (1983). At any given period, an intermediate producer is allowed to reoptimize her
price with probability (1− ω). Those firms that do not reoptimize their prices set them
using a partial indexation rule: P lt = (1 + πt−1)
ς P lt−1. The fraction of firms that set their
prices optimally choose the price P t that maximizes the present value of expected profits.
Wholesale producers: There is a continuum of infinitely lived wholesale producers,
indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], operating under perfect competition. Firms in the wholesale sector are
the actual producers in the model economy. Production is conducted combining labor and
capital using a Cobb-Douglas technology. Factor demands are obtained by solving the profit
maximization problem faced by each wholesale producer
min
kt,vt
Et
∞∑
t=0
βtR
λR1t+1
λR1t
(yt − rt−kt−1 − wtnt−1l1t − κvvt) , (14)
subject to
yt = Ak
1−α
t−1 (nt−1l1t)
α, (15)
nt = (1− σ)nt−1 + ρft vt. (16)
Future profits are discounted using the stochastic discount factor of patient households be-
cause they are the owners of the firms. We assume that all workers are perfect substitutes in
production irrespective of their balance sheet position. The probability of filling a vacancy
at any given period t, ρft is exogenous from the perspective of the firm but, at the aggregate
level, this probability is endogenously determined by the following condition:
ρwt (1− nt−1) ρft vt = χ1vχ2t [(1− nt−1) l2]1−χ2 . (17)
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The solution to the previous optimization problem delivers the following first order con-
ditions with respect to capital and vacancies:
rt = (1− α) yt
kt−1
(18)
κv
ρft
= βREt
[
λRt+1
λR1t
∂Vt+1
∂nt
]
, (19)
where Vt stands for the value function of the wholesale producer. Equation (19) reflects that
firms choose the number of vacancies so that the marginal posting cost per vacancy, κv, is
equal to the expected present value of holding the vacancy, where ∂Vt+1
∂nt
. The marginal value
of an additional match for the firm, λft, is
λft = α
yt
nt−1
− wtl1t + (1− σ) βREt
[
λR1t+1
λR1t
∂Vt+1
∂nt
]
. (20)
The marginal contribution of a new job to profits is equal to the marginal product net of
the wage bill, plus the capital value of the new job, adjusted by the probability of the match
continuing in the future.
Given that capital is pre determined, wholesale producers respond to unanticipated
shocks by adjusting labor input. In addition, to optimally choosing vacancy postings in
response to the shock, wholesale producers decide on the intensive margin of labor by en-
gaging in a negotiation with the trade union described in the following.
4.3 Trade in the Labor Market: The Labor Contract
Following Andre´s et al. (2013), we assume that although households types may differ in
their reservation wages, they delegate wage and hours bargaining to a trade union. The
trade union maximizes the aggregate marginal value of employment for workers
λht =
∑
i∈I
τ i
λiht
λi1t
, (21)
where
λiht
λi1t
represents the premium, in terms of consumption, of employment over unem-
ployment for household type i. The premiums are weighted according to the shares in the
population for each type of household. Delegating the bargaining process to a union implies
that all households receive the same wage, work the same number of hours, and face the
same unemployment rate.
The Nash bargaining problem maximizes the weighted product of the surpluses of the
union and the representative wholesale firm
max
wt,l1t
[∑
i∈I
τ i
λiht
λi1t
]λw
(λft)
1−λw = (λht)
λw (λft)
1−λw , (22)
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where λw ∈ [0, 1] represents the union’s bargaining power.
The solution to the Nash bargaining problem gives the optimal hours worked
α
yt
nt−1l1t
= φ1(1− l1t)−η
∑
i∈I
τ i
λi1t
, (23)
and the optimal real wage
wtl1t = λ
w
[
α
yt
nt−1
+
κvvt
1− nt−1
]
+(1− λw)
[
φ2
(1− l2)1−η
1− η − φ1
(1− l1t)1−η
1− η
]∑
i∈I
τ i
λi1t
+(1− λw) (1− σ − ρwt )
∑
˜i∈˜I
τ itEt
[
λ
˜i
ht+1
λ˜i1t+1
(
βR
λR1t+1
λR1t
− β˜iλ
˜i
1t+1
λ˜i1t
)]
, (24)
where i ∈ I refers to all types of households and i ∈ I˜ refers to the impatient consumers. The
wage prevailing in the search equilibrium is a weighted average of the highest feasible wage,
which is given by the marginal product of labor plus hiring costs, and the outside option for
the union members. This outside option has two components. The first is the weighted sum
of the lowest acceptable wage for each type of household, which is given by the difference
in the utility of leisure between employment and unemployment. The second is a weighted
sum for impatient households of an inequality term in utility. Impatient households cannot
smooth consumption intertemporally because they are constrained. However, when a match
occurs, impatient households know that such a match continues with probability (1− σ)
in the future, yielding labor income that can be used for consumption. Hence, impatient
households use the labor negotiations to improve their lifetime utility by narrowing the gap
in utility with respect to intertemporal optimizing households. If the share of households
with the wider gap in utility increases, then the resulting optimal wage in the bargaining
process will be higher.
4.4 Policy Instruments and Resources Constraint
The monetary authority follows a Taylor-type interest rate rule,
1 + rnt =
(
1 + rnt−1
)rR [(1 + πt)1+rπ (1 + rn)]1−rR , (25)
where rn is the steady-state level of the interest rate. The parameter rR captures the level
of interest rate inertia and rπ represents the weight given to inflation in the policy rule.
Revenues and expenditures are made consistent by the government intertemporal budget
constraint,
dPt = gt + trht +
1 + rnt−1
1 + πt
dPt−1. (26)
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To ensure stationarity of the debt-to-GDP ratio, we impose the following fiscal policy reaction
function:
trht = trht−1 − ψ1
[
dPt
gdpt
− d
P
gdp
]
− ψ2
[
dPt
gdpt
− d
P
t−1
gdpt−1
]
, (27)
where ψ1 > 0 captures the speed of adjustment from the current debt-to-GDP ratio toward
the debt-to-GDP target ratio,
(
dP
gdp
)
. The value of ψ2 > 0 is chosen to ensure a smooth
adjustment of current debt toward its steady-state level.
Finally, the aggregate resource constraint guarantees that the sum of demand components
plus the cost of posting vacancies equals aggregate output,
yt = Atk
1−α
t−1 (nt−1l1t)
α = ct + jt
(
1 +
φ
2
[
jt
kt−1
])
+ gt + κvvt. (28)
where
ct =
∑
i∈I
τ icit. (29)
5 Calibration
We first describe the calibration of the household-specific parameters, which is summarized
in Table 9. The first column reports the household weights, τ i, which are set to the PSID
weights for 1999 in our baseline calibration. The second column shows the calibration of
the intertemporal discount factor. Following Iacoviello (2005), the intertemporal discount
factor for patient households, βR, is equal to 0.99, and for impatient households, βI , it is
equal to 0.95. The third column reports the preference parameter on housing, φx, which,
by assumption, is identical for all homeowners and zero for non-homeowners. The value
of this parameter, as well as the total stock of housing, X, depends on the value of the
private-debt-to-output ratio at the steady state, d
R
/y. As in Iacoviello (2005), the private-
debt-to-output ratio, d
R
/y, is chosen so that the total stock of housing over annual output
is 140 percent. Given these assumptions, the preference parameter on housing, φx, is set
to 0.12. The last column in Table 9 reports the values for the leverage parameters, mi:
Low-leveraged homeowners, BL, can borrow up to 73.5 percent of the expected value of
their real estate holdings; high-leveraged homeowners, BH, can leverage up to 98.5 percent;
and impatient households with negative wealth, EK, can borrow against 50 percent of the
weighted sum of their current and future labor income.
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Table 9: Calibrated Parameters: Household Sector
Type τ i β φix m
i
R 0.43 0.99 0.12 −−
HH 0.05 0.95 0.12 −−
BL 0.06 0.95 0.12 0.735
BH 0.11 0.95 0.12 0.985
HNH 0.19 0.95 0 −−
EK 0.16 0.95 0 0.50
Table 10: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Source
Technology:
Output elasticity to labor, α 0.7 Choi and R´ıos-Rull (2009)
Depreciation rate of capital, δ 0.025 Inside plausible literature range
Elasticity of final goods, θ 6 Inside plausible literature range
Frictions:
Calvo parameter, ω 0.75 Inside plausible literature range
Investment adjustment costs, φ 5.5 QUEST II
Inflation indexation, ς 0.4 Kolasa et al. (2012)
Policy:
Fiscal reaction parameter, ψ1 0.01 Andre´s et al. (2016)
Fiscal reaction parameter, ψ2 0.2 Andre´s et al. (2016)
Steady state gov.-debt-to-output, dp/y 0.73 Sample average 1999-2013
Steady state spending to output ratio, g/y 0.17 Sample average
Interest rate smoothing, rR 0.73 Iacoviello (2005)
Interest rate reaction to inflation, 1 + rπ 1.30 Iacoviello (2005)
Preferences:
Labor elasticity, η 2 Andolfatto (1996)
Time spent job searching by unemployed, l21/6 Andolfatto (1996) and Che´ron and Langot (2004)
Time spent working, l¯1 1/3 Andolfatto (1996) and Che´ron and Langot (2004)
Leisure preference (empl.), φ1 1.59 Steady-state equations
Leisure preference (unempl.), φ2 1.04 Steady-state equations
Labor market:
Workers’ bargaining power, λw 0.4 Inside plausible literature range
Scale parameter matching, χ1 1.56 Steady-state equations
Matching elasticity, χ2 0.6 Monacelli et al. (2010)
Cost of vacancy posting, κv 0.04 Choi and R´ıos-Rull (2009)
Transition rate, σ 0.15 Andolfatto (1996) and Che´ron and Langot (2004)
Vacancy filling probability, ρ¯f 0.9 Andolfatto (1996) and Che´ron and Langot (2004)
LR employment ratio, n¯ 0.75 Choi and R´ıos-Rull (2009)
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Table 10 shows the calibration for the remaining parameters. We overview here the
parameters linked to the monetary and fiscal policy rules, to preferences, and to search and
matching frictions in the labor market.
The specification of the fiscal reaction function and its calibration following Andre´s et al.
(2016) guarantees a monetary equilibrium for a loose enough fiscal rule. The steady state
value of transfers is such that the resulting the resulting public debt to output ratio is equal
to 73%, which is the sample average in the years under analysis, 1999 to 2013. Similarly,
the steady state value of the spending to output ratio is equal to its sample average, 17%.
Taylor’s rule parameters, rR = 0.73 and 1 + rπ = 1.30 are taken from Iacoviello (2005).
Regarding preference parameters, we assume that the labor supply elasticity, η, is equal
to 2 so that the average individual labor supply elasticity, given by
(
η−1
[
1/l1 − 1
])
, is equal
to 1, as in Andolfatto (1996). Following Andolfatto (1996) and Che´ron and Langot (2004),
we set the fraction of time spent working, l1, equal to 1/3 and the fraction of time households
spend searching, l2, equal to 1/6. Values for φ1 and φ2 are obtained in conjunction with the
marginal value of employment using a system of steady state equations.
Finally, we discuss the calibration of the parameters linked to the labor market. Worker’s
bargaining power, λw, is assumed to be equal to 0.4, which is also within the range of
standard values in the literature7. We also assume that the equilibrium unemployment rate
is socially efficient (see Hosios, 1990), which implies that λw = 1 − χ2, and then we set the
elasticity of matching to vacancies χ2 = 0.6, which is close to the 0.5 value in Monacelli
et al. (2010). The scale parameter of the matching function, χ1, can be computed using the
identity between matching flows and unemployment flows, evaluated at the steady state.8 We
calibrate the ratio of recruiting expenditures to output, κvv/y, to represent 0.5 percentage
points of output as in Che´ron and Langot (2004) and Choi and Rı´os-Rull (2009), and very
close to the value of 0.44 implied by the calibration of Monacelli et al. (2010). From this
ratio, we can obtain the cost of vacancy posting κv, which is then equal to 0.04. Following
Andolfatto (1996) and Che´ron and Langot (2004), we set the exogenous transition rate from
employment to unemployment, σ, equal to 0.15 and the probability of a vacant position
becoming a productive job, ρf , equal to 0.9. The long-run employment rate, n, is set to 0.75,
as in Choi and Rı´os-Rull (2009).
7For example, this value falls between the one in Christiano et al. (2011) and Mortensen and Nagypal
(2007)
8Matching flows at the steady state are equal to χ1v
χ2 [(1− n) l2]1−χ2 and the unemployment flows are
equal to σn.
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6 The transmission mechanism of government spend-
ing shocks
In this section, we study the transmission of government spending shocks in the model econ-
omy calibrated with the empirical weights of 1999. The size of the government spending
shock is equal to 1 percent of output, and the shock is assumed to fall exponentially ac-
cording to the function gt = ρggt−1 with ρg = 0.75. We first analyze the responses of the
representative member of each type of household; second, we discuss the aggregate effects of
fiscal shocks and their sensitivity to changes in the distribution of households.
6.1 Individual Responses
Households’ responses to a government spending shock are determined by the income effect,
the wealth effect, and the credit effect. Given our assumptions regarding labor market
frictions, the income effect is identical for all households in the model economy irrespective
of their balance sheet characteristics. However, the wealth and credit effects are type-specific.
After an expansionary fiscal shock, given that capital is predetermined in our model
economy, wholesale producers meet the additional product demand by increasing their labor
demand. Wholesale producers can adjust both the intensive and extensive margin of labor
input. While hours are optimally chosen each period, a newly filled vacancy is a potentially
long-lasting relationship with the worker, as separations are not endogenous. As shown in
Figure 2, in response to an expansionary government spending shock, wholesale firms mostly
rely on adjusting the intensive margin on impact, only creating some employment in the sub-
sequent periods. The relative magnitude of the responses of hours and employment are quite
different: While the peak of hours is at around a 2 percent increase, the peak of employment
is at around a 0.15 percent increase. The bargaining between the wholesale producers and
the union results in an increase of wages on impact. The positive strong responses of hours
and wages on impact, in addition to the very moderate increase in employment, translate into
an increase of labor income for households. Therefore, the income effect of the government
spending shock is positive and identical for all households.
Although the wealth effect is type-specific, there are some common features. For example,
given the deflationary pressures on housing prices triggered by the government spending
shock, as shown in Figure 3, wealth of homeowners in the model economy declines on impact.
The inflationary pressures in overall prices reduce the real burden of debt for indebted
impatient households. Fisher effects depress the real return on lending activities for patient
households, which implies an even larger negative wealth effect. Therefore, while the wealth
effect is clearly negative for patient households, the sign of the wealth effect for impatient
homeowners is ambiguous, depending on their balance sheet composition and the calibration
of the model.
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Figure 2: Income Effect: Response to a Government Spending Shock (in Deviations from
Steady State)
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Overall, the available resources for consumption for patient households are scarcer after
an expansionary government spending shock because, as shown in Figure 4(c), the fiscal shock
triggers an expansion of both public and private debt that, in our model, must be financed
by patient households. As shown in Figure 4(b), the negative wealth effect translates into
a negative response of investment in both housing (red line) and physical capital (blue line)
for patient households. Therefore, as reported in Figure 4(a), the negative wealth and credit
effects more than dominate the positive income effect resulting in a negative response of
consumption (red line) by patient households on impact that exceeds that of wealth (blue
line).
Figure 5 reports the impulse response functions for impatient homeowners. The wealth
effect for impatient homeowners without liabilities is unambiguously negative, given the
devaluation of the housing holdings, and the credit effect is zero. As shown in Figure 5(a),
the income effect dominates the wealth effect for impatient homeowners, as the response
of consumption (red line) is positive on impact and the demand for housing increases on
impact, as reported in Figure 5(b). Impatient homeowners use the investment in real estate
to do some intertemporal smoothing.
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Figure 3: Wealth Effect: Response to a Government Spending Shock (in Deviations from
Steady State)
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The sign of the wealth effect for impatient indebted homeowners depends on the relative
size of the negative housing price effect and the positive Fisher effect. Given our calibra-
tion, the drag in wealth linked to the response of housing prices dominates, as shown in
Figure 5(c)and Figure 5(e). The size of the drop in wealth for impatient homeowners is a
negative function of the level of housing holdings at the steady state. As reported in Ta-
ble B.4 in Appendix B, the level of housing at the steady state is an increasing function in
household indebtedness. Therefore, the response of wealth for impatient indebted homeown-
ers with high leverage is much larger than the response for homeowners with low leverage
and without liabilities.
The credit effect for impatient indebted homeowners is clearly positive. The borrowing
ability of these households is determined by the expected value of their housing holdings.
As shown in Figure 3, housing prices decline on impact but then converge steadily to their
steady-state level from below. The fall in current housing prices increases the demand
for housing by non-Ricardian households, which increases the total value of the collateral
because it depends on the discounted expected liquidation value of current housing holdings.
Therefore, after a government spending shock, there is an expansion of mortgage credit (blue
lines in Figure 5(d)and Figure 5(f)). Despite the potentially large negative wealth effect, the
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Figure 4: Patient Households: Responses to a Government Spending Shock (in Deviations
from Steady State)
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(c) Private debt (red) and public debt (blue)
positive income and credit effects dominate so that the response of consumption is positive
for all impatient indebted homeowners.
The response of consumption among impatient homeowners is positively correlated with
the level of indebtedness. Figure 6 shows that the consumption response on impact of
impatient indebted homeowners with high leverage (green line) is larger than the response
of impatient indebted homeowners with low leverage (red line), which is larger than the
response of impatient indebted homeowners without liabilities (blue line). These results are
along the lines of Cloyne and Surico (2017), who conclude that consumption by indebted
homeowners is more sensitive to fiscal shocks than that of homeowners without a mortgage.
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Figure 5: Impatient Homeowners: Responses to a Government Spending Shock (in
Deviations from Steady State)
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(f) Homeowners with high leverage: Housing
investment (red) and debt (blue)
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Figure 6: Impatient Homeowners: Response of Consumption to a Government Spending
Shock (in Deviations from Steady State)
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Note: The blue line represents the response of impatient homeowners without liabilities, the red line is the
response of impatient homeowners with low leverage, and the green line represents the response of impatient
homeowners with high leverage.
For impatient non-homeowners, the wealth effect on impact is always non-negative. Im-
patient households without assets or liabilities have a zero wealth effect, and, hence, their
consumption response mimics the response of labor income, as shown in Figure 7(a). Given
the inflationary pressures, the wealth effect for households holding only liabilities is unam-
biguously positive. Moreover, the credit effect for impatient households with negative wealth
is also positive, as reported in Figure 7(c). The positive income, wealth, and credit effects
imply the strong response of consumption (red line) in Figure 7(b).
Figure 8 shows that the responses of individual consumption range from a 0.5 percent
decline for patient households to over a 4 percent increase for impatient non-homeowners.
Moreover, this figure shows that in our model, the response of individual consumption is
negatively correlated with the level of wealth. These results are along the lines of the recent
empirical evidence linking wealth and consumption such as Anderson et al. (2016); Carroll
et al. (2014); Kaplan et al. (2014); and DeGiorgi and Gambetti (2012).
6.2 Aggregate Responses
The relative weight of each type of household in the population determines the sign and
magnitude of the aggregate consumption multiplier. The two extreme responses to a fiscal
shock are associated with Ricardian and indebted impatient households without assets, EK
households. Therefore, changes in the relative share of these two types of households in the
overall population are key in the transmission of fiscal shocks. Table 8 in Section 3 shows
that, since 1999, the shares that have changed the most are precisely the ones at the opposite
ends of the distribution.
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Figure 7: Impatient Non-Homeowners: Responses to a Government Spending Shock (in
Deviations from Steady State)
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(c) Non-homeowners with liabilities: Debt
We assess the effect of the observed changes in households shares in the transmission of
government spending shocks by computing the multipliers for economies that are identical
except for the shares of household types. Table 11 reports the evolution of the aggregate
impact multipliers. Given the theoretical nature of our exercise, and the assumptions made
in their calculation, we do not draw any particular conclusion from the absolute values or
the sign in the case of the employment multiplier in Table 11. We focus on the relative
variation across cross-sections of the United States because the evolution of the multipliers
over time shows the effect of the change in the distribution of household wealth and debt in
the population. This exercise provides an indicator of what can be missed, in terms of the
effects of fiscal policy, in models that do not allow for a fine enough disaggregation of the
household sector.
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Figure 8: Response of Consumption to a Government Spending Shock (in Deviations from
Steady State)
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Note: The light green line represents the response of patient households, the blue line is the response of
impatient homeowners without liabilities, the red line corresponds to the response of impatient homeowner
with low leverage, the green line is the response of impatient homeowners with high leverage, the black line is
the response of impatient households without assets or liabilities, and the orange line represents the response
of households with negative wealth.
Table 11: The Evolution of Fiscal Effects
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Output 1.540 1.557 1.555 1.640 1.737 2.115 2.173 2.412
Consumption 1.159 1.192 1.188 1.351 1.533 2.253 2.363 2.814
Hours 2.207 2.232 2.229 2.352 2.490 3.035 3.119 3.463
Employment 0.024 0.010 0.011 -0.061 -0.148 -0.512 -0.573 -0.825
Note: The multipliers are defined as percentage variation of the variable on impact.
In the years before the Great Recession, these multipliers remain fairly stable, but they
have changed substantially since 2005. The output multiplier increases 50 percent from
1999 to 2013, with about 80 percent of that increase occurring between 2005 and 2013.
The increase in the size of the output multiplier is similar to the change in the response of
aggregate consumption.9
The model predicts an increase in real wages following the expansion in government
spending that is consistent with the empirical evidence (Gal´ı, Valle´s, and Lo´pez-Salido, 2007;
9All of the results are robust to alternative parameterizations, other thresholds in the empirical identi-
fication of the different households types (a = 0.25 and a = 0.75), and distributing transfers/taxes among
households according to their total income. Table A.3 in Appendix A reports the sensitivity analysis.
Caldara and Kamps, 2008; Pappa, 2009; and Andre´s, Bosca´ and Ferri, 2015). According
to our model, the wage increase becomes stronger as the share of constrained consumers –
in particular, impatient non-homeowners, HNH and EK types – increases. If we consider
the optimal wage and hours equations (equation 24 and equation 23, respectively) we can
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show that an increase in the share of impatient indebted households without assets, τEK ,
strengthens workers’ bargaining power, given that the marginal utility of consumption of this
type of household, λEKt , falls strongly after the fiscal shock. The higher bargaining power of
workers is reflected in the higher wages and hours worked of employed workers. Higher wages
limit the incentives of firms to create new jobs through vacancy posting because additional
vacancies now have a lower expected surplus. Firms are more prone to meet the additional
output demand through a strong increase in hours worked per employee than through job
creation. In this way, the model predicts a simultaneous increase in the output multiplier
and a reduction in the employment multiplier so that recoveries driven by fiscal expansions
are less intense in job creation as we move from a primarily Ricardian economy to one with
a relatively large share of severely constrained households.
The evolution of the total hours and employment multipliers suggests that the changes in
the distribution of households have strengthened the response of the intensive labor margin
versus the extensive margin to government spending shocks. Figure 9 reports the impulse
response functions for aggregate hours and employment in 1999 and in 2013. As shown in
Figure 9 and in Table 11, while government spending shocks were neutral on employment in
the early years under analysis, they have had a crowding-out effect on employment since the
Great Recession, and the positive effect on total hours has increased over time. Our results
point toward not just a smaller crowding-in effect for employment but also a crowding-out
of the extensive margin with a contemporaneous enhancement of the crowding-in effect for
the intensive margin. We argue that the main takeaway regarding the evolution of the
employment multiplier is that the ability of government shocks to generate employment, if
any, has become weaker over time.
In the literature, there is no consensus about the effect of government spending shocks
on employment: Caldara and Kamps (2008), using VAR analysis, estimate that employ-
ment does not respond to government spending shocks, while Alesina et al. (2002) show
that expansionary fiscal policy puts upward pressure on private-sector wages, leading to a
decline in profits and employment. Cantore et al. (2014) show, in a model with search and
matching, deep habits, and a CES technology function with a low elasticity of substitution
between labor and capital, that a jobless recovery – a recovery with low job creation – can
be generated after a positive government spending shock. In particular, they show that job-
less recoveries are compatible with environments with smaller model-implied employment
multipliers. Recently, Klein (2017b) shows that in periods of high leverage, the employment
multiplier is smaller than in periods characterized by low leverage.
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Figure 9: Impulse Response Functions (in Deviations from Steady State): Aggregate
Variables, 1999 versus 2013
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Note: The blue line represents the response in an economy with the empirical weights of 1999. The red line
is the response with the 2013 empirical weights.
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7 Government spending multipliers and wealth distri-
bution
7.1 Wealth Inequality and the Fiscal Multiplier
In this section, we look at the link between the distribution of wealth and the effects of fiscal
policy shocks. According to the Gini coefficients reported in Table 12 for all observations
in the PSID, wealth inequality has increased during the sample period. Visual inspection
suggests that the increase in the Gini coefficient in wealth from 0.843 in 1999 to 0.869 in 2013
is mostly due to divergences between household groups, as the within-group coefficients have
remained more stable. We can compare the between-groups coefficient – the second column
in Table 12 – with the Gini coefficient implied by our model, which is based on treating each
group as a representative household.
Table 12: Gini Coefficients (Non-Housing Real Wealth)
PSID Sample R HH BL BH HNH
1999 0.862 0.851 0.729 0.589 0.516 0.494 0.545
2001 0.856 0.843 0.708 0.597 0.531 0.508 0.582
2003 0.858 0.844 0.712 0.529 0.470 0.500 0.580
2005 0.867 0.853 0.718 0.530 0.512 0.487 0.566
2007 0.874 0.861 0.729 0.564 0.483 0.475 0.580
2009 0.885 0.872 0.734 0.538 0.522 0.494 0.562
2011 0.884 0.872 0.732 0.530 0.502 0.494 0.548
2013 0.885 0.874 0.732 0.567 0.588 0.469 0.533
Note: The first column refers to the overall PSID population, while the second column reports the coeffi-
cients for the sub-sample we consider in the analysis.
In Figure 10, we plot the model-implied output multipliers against the model-based Gini
coefficients. Both variables are computed using the observed household shares (see Table 8)
and the model-implied wealth. Figure 10 shows a positive correlation between the output
multiplier and wealth inequality. Given that the output multiplier increases with the share
of constrained agents in the economy, we argue that our model suggests that discretionary
fiscal policy can be more effective in more unequal economies.
Figure 11 shows the correlation between the model-implied Gini coefficients and the ones
obtained for the sample of the PSID we used in identifying household types. There is a
large positive correlation between the simulated and the observed wealth inequality indexes.
Therefore, we conclude that our model is capable of reproducing a significant proportion of
the observed mean variation in wealth inequality. This result is consistent with the positive
association between wealth inequality and the aggregate marginal propensity to consume
documented by Brinca et al. (2016); Carroll et al. (2014); and Krueger et al. (2016).
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Figure 10: Output Multiplier and Inequality Implied by the Model
 
7.2 Welfare Effects
So far, we have assessed the effects of government spending shocks on household consumption
across household types. But households’ utility also depends on their real estate holdings
and leisure. So to evaluate the distributional consequences of government spending shocks in
a more general way, we compute the effect of these shocks on households’ welfare. We define
welfare V
i
as the discounted sum of a household i period utility, conditional on the economy
being at the steady state in period 0 (common to all the experiments) and remaining constant
throughout
V
i
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(βi)t
[
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)
+ φix ln
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xit
)
+ nt−1φ1
(1−l1t)1−η
1−η
+(1− nt−1)φ2 (1−l2)1−η1−η
]
,
where i is the index referring to household’s type. We define V i,s as the welfare of a type i
household under a shock, conditional on the state of the economy in period t = 0 and taking
into account the reaction of the variables before returning again to their initial steady state
V i,s =
∞∑
t=0
(βi)t
[
ln
(
ci,st
)
+ φix ln
(
xi,st
)
+ nst−1φ1
(1−ls1t)1−η
1−η
+(1− nst−1)φ2 (1−l2)
1−η
1−η
]
, (30)
where ci,st , x
i,s
t , n
i,s
t−1, and l
s
1t denote consumption, housing, employment rate, and hours per
worker, respectively, under a fiscal shock.
We calculate the welfare cost Δi associated with a fiscal measure as the fraction of steady-
state consumption that a household would be willing to give up in order to be as well off
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Figure 11: Gini Coefficient
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after the fiscal shock –, that is,
V i,s =
∞∑
t=0
(βi)t
[
ln
[
cit (1−Δi)
]
+ φix ln
(
xit
)
+ nt−1φ1
(1−l1t)1−η
1−η
+(1− nt−1)φ2 (1−l2)1−η1−η
]
. (31)
Thus, from (30) and (31)
Δi = 1− exp{
(
V i,s − V i
) (
1− βi)}, (32)
where a negative value for Δ implies a welfare gain.
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Figure 12: Welfare Effects across Time, by Household Type
Figure 12 shows the welfare costs, if positive, and gains, if negative, for each type of
household over time. After a government spending shock, welfare for Ricardian households
(the richest type of households), but also for high- and low-leveraged impatient households
with housing, BH and BL, declines, while welfare improves for all other types of impatient
households. The welfare benefit from fiscal expansions increases considerably after 2007,
mainly for the poorest types (HH, HNH, and EK households). Therefore, we argue that
fiscal interventions are more effective in redistributing consumption when there is a higher
degree of inequality.
Fiscal policy may thus have a non negligible distributional effect on welfare grounds, even
under the assumption that government spending is pure waste and does not directly affect
preferences. How each household’s welfare is affected depends on her position in the financial
market. By the same token, and related to the current austerity debate, our results point
towards important welfare effects of fiscal consolidations that could harm the less financially
well-off part of the population, in line with the results obtained by Klein and Winkler (2017).
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8 Conclusion
We explore the macroeconomic implications of government spending shocks in an economy
populated by six representative agents that differ in their attitude towards savings, real
estate holdings, and access to credit. In particular, we propose classifying households in
the PSID into six types: (i) patient or Ricardian households; (ii) impatient households with
real estate holdings and no liabilities; (iii) impatient households with housing and a high
loan-to-value ratio; (iv) impatient households with housing and a low loan-to-value ratio;
(v) impatient households without access to credit and without housing; and (vi) impatient
households without housing but with access to non-mortgaged credit. We show that, since
the Great Recession, the share of patient households has declined, while the share of indebted
households with no assets has increased.
We calibrate a DSGE model according to the observed evolution of household shares in
the population to show that the heterogeneity in the household consumption response can
account for important variations in the size of fiscal multipliers over time. More precisely,
we find that our model is capable of accounting for a variety of facts that have been re-
cently documented in the relevant literature: (i) the response of individual consumption to
a government spending shock is negatively correlated with the individual’s net wealth and
positively correlated with the level of indebtedness; (ii) the size of the fiscal multiplier is
very sensitive to the distribution of wealth, increasing significantly with the fall in the share
of Ricardian households and the increase in the share of indebted impatient consumers with
no assets; (iii) the employment multiplier declines as the share of agents with zero or nega-
tive wealth in the population increases; (iv) output multipliers are positively correlated with
wealth inequality; and (v) the welfare effect of fiscal shocks across households depends on
their financial position: poorer (wealthier) households are the winners (losers) of increases
in public spending.
In the model, we have restricted households to behave identically in the labor market,
because we wanted to focus on the role played by their balance sheet position in the trans-
mission of government spending shocks. A natural extension of our work is to explore the
relationship between households’ balance sheet heterogeneity and labor income heterogeneity
in a macro model informed by micro data, which is next in our research agenda.
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Table A.1: Gini Coefficients
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Non-housing wealth 0.851 0.843 0.844 0.853 0.861 0.872 0.872 0.874
Income 0.461 0.479 0.473 0.485 0.485 0.487 0.490 0.502
Notes: Gini coefficient computed using the subsample of the PSID used in the analysis for each wave.
Table A.2: Medians of the Distributions in 1999
Household Non-housing wealth Income
Patient: R 65,652 39,550
Impatient: HH 4,271 25,628
Impatient: BL 10,599 44,699
Impatient: BH 8,543 44,580
Impatient: HNH 3,164 22,955
Impatient: EK -949 15,029
Table A.3: Sensitivity Analysis: Multipliers for 1999 and 2013
Output Consumption Hours Employment
1999 2013 1999 2013 1999 2013 1999 2013
Benchmark 1.540 2.412 1.159 2.814 2.207 3.463 0.024 -0.825
λw ⇒ 0.4 to 0.5 1.657 2.958 1.388 3.831 2.376 4.252 -0.062 -1.110
rπ = 0.30 to 0.25 1.645 2.628 1.306 3.157 2.358 3.776 -0.005 -0.954
ρg = 0.75 to 0.80 1.468 2.294 1.011 2.584 2.104 3.294 0.106 -0.694
βI = 0.95 to 0.97 1.519 2.347 1.115 2.685 2.178 3.369 0.034 -0.770
mBH = 0.985 to 0.90 1.465 2.167 1.023 2.360 2.100 3.109 0.081 -0.550
mEK = 0.5 to 0.985 1.590 2.442 1.252 2.872 2.279 3.507 -0.042 -0.897
ω = 0.75 to 0.70 1.125 1.496 0.639 1.452 1.610 2.143 0.065 -0.364
φ = 5.5 to 7.5 1.618 2.709 1.252 3.261 2.319 3.892 0.100 -0.834
a = 0.5 to 0.25 1.285 1.712 0.653 1.473 1.841 2.455 0.211 -0.139
a = 0.5 to 0.75 1.712 3.185 1.498 4.282 2.454 4.581 -0.125 -1.688
trhR = trhi 2.166 3.518 2.284 4.859 3.108 5.064 -0.377 -2.249
Note: λw is worker’s bargaining power, rπ is response to inflation in the Taylor rule, ρg is autocorrelation
coefficient of the government spending shock, βI is discount rate of impatient households, mBH is loan-to-
value ratio for impatient households with high leverage, ω is Calvo parameter, mEK is loan-to-value ratio for
impatient households with negative wealth, and φ is investment adjustment costs parameter, a is income-
to-wealth threshold, trhR = trhi is transfers receieved/taxes paid by all households according to their total
income, which for Ricardians is the sum of labor income, the return on capital, and the return on private
and public debt; and for impatient households, it is just labor income.
A Tables
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B Steady-state analysis
Table B.4 reports the steady state levels of consumption, labor income, and gross and net
wealth across the six household types in our model economy. The last column in Table B.4
reports the wealth-to-labor income ratio, which shows substantial variability. Despite the
large degree of heterogeneity in net wealth at the steady state, the assumption on identical
labor income translates into a more egalitarian distribution of consumption.10
Table B.4: Steady-State Values
Cons1 Lab income1 Net wealth Assets Liabilities Ratio2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (3)/(2)
R 0.766 0.578 36.846 36.846 0 15.9
HNH 0.578 0.578 0 0 0 0
HH 0.578 0.578 1.585 1.585 0 0.68
BL 0.551 0.578 0.972 3.668 2.696 0.42
BH 0.513 0.578 0.099 6.632 6.533 0.04
EK 0.575 0.578 -0.287 0 0.287 -0.12
Notes:1Quarterly data. 2In annual terms
At the steady state, Ricardian consumers achieve the highest level of per capita consump-
tion, followed by impatient households with no liabilities, HNH and HH. The steady-state
consumption of impatient households with no liabilities is identical irrespective of whether
they are homeowners, HH, or not, HNH. For households participating in the credit market,
per capita consumption at the steady state is inversely related with their indebtedness level.
Households use their income for consumption and interest payments on debt. Therefore,
given that labor income is identical across households, heavily indebted consumers can only
afford lower levels of consumption at the steady state. In our calibration, the indebtedness of
impatient households with negative wealth, EK, is lower than that of impatient homeowners.
Therefore, the consumption level at the steady state for EK households exceeds that for BH
and BL households.
C Comparison with Kaplan et al. (2014)
Kaplan et al. (2014) use a two-asset model with different liquidity characteristics for each
asset to argue that there may be households behaving like traditional hand-to-mouth con-
10In Table B.4, the dispersion in labor income is, by construction, zero, and, hence, lower than that of
net wealth. Table A.2 in Appendix A shows that the observed dispersion in (median) non-housing wealth is
larger than the dispersion in (median) income.
sumers, consuming their current income completely, while holding potentially large amounts
of illiquid assets – the so-called wealthy hand-to-mouth consumers. While Kaplan et al.
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(2014) incorporate households with positive wealth to the hand-to-mouth pool, they exclude
households with negative wealth. Kaplan et al. (2014) estimate the shares of non-hand-
to-mouth, N-HtM ; wealthy hand-to-mouth, W-HtM ; and poor hand-to-mouth consumers,
P-HtM, using two alternative surveys for the United States: the Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances and the PSID. Using the PSID, their definition of income reduces to labor earnings
of the household plus government transfers and wealth is defined as the sum of net liquid
wealth and net illiquid wealth. The latter is defined as the net value of home equity plus the
net value of other real estate plus the value of private annuities or IRAs and the value of other
investments in trusts or estates, bond funds, and life insurance policies. Net liquid wealth
is defined as the difference between liquid assets and liquid debt. Liquid assets include the
value of checking and savings accounts, money market funds, certificates of deposit, savings
bonds, and Treasury bills plus directly held shares of stock in publicly held corporations,
mutual funds, or investment trusts. Before 2011, they define liquid debt as the value of debts
other than mortgages, such as credit cards, student loans, medical and legal bills, and per-
sonal loans. Since 2011, liquid debt only includes credit card debt. Kaplan et al. (2014) use
a threshold strategy to separate hand-to-mouth behavior from intertemporally optimizing
agents. A household is classified as non-hand-to-mouth, N-HtM, if her wealth exceeds half of
her income.11 A hand-to-mouth household is wealthy hand-to-mouth, W-HtM, if she holds
positive net illiquid wealth and poor hand-to-mouth, W-HtM, if she holds a non-positive net
illiquid wealth.
Table C.5 reports the percentages of each type of household we consider in the paper
that would be classified as N-HtM, W-HtM or P-HtM by Kaplan et al. (2014). For example,
the first row in Table C.5 shows that of the Ricardian households we identify in the PSID,
86 percent would be classified as N-HtM by Kaplan et al. (2014), 6 percent would have been
classified as W-HtM, and 9 percent as P-HtM. Among the impatient homeowners, those
without liabilities, HH, are mostly classified as intertemporally optimizing agents by Kaplan
et al. (2014). Note that the definition of wealth in Kaplan et al. (2014) includes the net
equity of the main home, which for HH households is positive. Hence, it is more likely that
HH households satisfy the threshold condition with housing wealth despite not satisfying
it when considering non-housing wealth. For indebted impatient households, 88 percent of
those with low loan-to-value ratio, BL, are considered to be N-HtM, while only 38 percent
of those with high loan-to-value ratio, BH, are classified as such. About half of the BH
11Kaplan et al. (2014) restrict wealth for households in their sample to be non-negative, but net worth
can be negative.
households are classified as W-HtM consumers. As expected, the vast majority of impatient
households without assets are classified as P-HtM by Kaplan et al. (2014)’s identification
strategy.
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Table C.5: Comparison Table: Percent Adds by Row, Year 1999
NHTM WHTM PHTM
Patient: R 85 6 9
Impatient: HH 75 25 0
Impatient: BL 88 12 0
Impatient: BH 38 52 10
Impatient: HNH 4 14 82
Impatient: EK 1 8 90
In Table C.6, we report which percentage of households classified as N-HtM, W-HtM or
P-HtM by Kaplan et al. (2014) would be classified in each of our types. For example, out
of the N-HtM consumers, only 67 percent would be considered Ricardians while 31 percent
would be classified as impatient homeowners. Most W-HtM households are classified as
impatient indebted homeowners with a high loan-to-value ratio, BH, followed by Ricardians,
R, and impatient households without assets or liabilities, HH. Finally, P-HtM households
mostly fall in the two categories we define for impatient non-homeowners.
Table C.6: Comparison Table: Percent Adds by Column, Year 1999
NHTM WHTM PHTM
Patient: R 67 15 10
Impatient: HH 6 6 0
Impatient: BL 14 6 0
Impatient: BH 11 47 4
Impatient: HNH 2 18 45
Impatient: EK 0 8 40
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